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Sabine C Koch, Thomas Fuchs, Michela Summa and Cornelia Müller (eds)
Body memory, metaphor and movement. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2012. 468 pp. 
€99.00/$149.00 (hbk), ISBN: 9789027213501, €33.00/$49.95 (pbk), ISBN: 9789027213556
Reviewed by: Giovanna Colombetti, University of Exeter, UK; Dylan Trigg, University College Dublin, Ireland; 
Susanne Ravn, University of Southern Denmark, Denmark
As the editors announce in the introduction, this volume brings together contributions from differ-
ent disciplines on the phenomenon of body memory, understood as ‘the totality of the embodied 
subject’s dispositions, which allow the person to react to present situations and requirements on the 
basis of past experience’ (p. 2). The first part of the book presents contributions from phenomenol-
ogy, the second part from cognitive science and the third part from ‘embodied therapies’, namely, 
therapeutic practices, which somehow include movement practices and different bodily techniques 
(such as Mindfulness, Authentic Movement, Dance/Movement Therapies, Focusing).
This division reflects the threefold aim of the book: to clarify the phenomenon of body memory, 
to develop empirical approaches from an embodied perspective and to discuss the implications of this 
embodied perspective for the field of therapy. Some of the central questions that the book seeks to 
address are as follows: What is body memory? Is the concept of body memory a useful one? How can 
body memory be measured? When and how does body memory become explicit? How can therapists 
access body memory in order to efficiently treat individuals? We shall review each individual book 
section in turn to assess whether the volume successfully answers at least some of these questions.
Review of Part I: ‘Contributions from Phenomenology’ (by 
Giovanna Colombetti)
The first section of the book is primarily concerned with the question of what body memory is. 
Thomas Fuchs characterizes it as a set of acquired bodily dispositions and skills that tacitly influ-
ence one’s present experience and behaviour (p. 9). He distinguishes between various forms of 
body memory, such as procedural memory, interpersonal memory, pain memory and traumatic 
memory. Procedural memory is the disposition spontaneously to recall sequences of movements 
when skilfully engaging in activities such as playing an instrument, dancing or playing tennis. 
Interpersonal memory refers to the disposition to interact in specific ways with other people. Pain 
memory refers to the disposition to relive painful experiences in certain circumstances, and can 
lead to psychosomatic illness; similarly for traumatic memory, which refers to the disposition to 
undergo particularly strong experiences (such as panic attacks) when confronted with situations 
that resemble former traumatic circumstances.
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It is certainly important to point out that the body, in virtue of its history and accumulation of 
experiences, has acquired tendencies (not only sensorimotor but also affective and interpersonal 
ones) that enable it to respond spontaneously or tacitly – that is, without the intervention of con-
scious or explicit control. The body, as Fuchs and many other contributors to this first part of the 
volume emphasize, is a historical entity, and its past influences its present as well as its future. The 
notion of body memory in particular alerts us to the fact that memory is not just the recollection of 
the past, but a present condition that affects every moment of our existence. Every body has its own 
memory, which keeps changing to incorporate new activities and experiences. To use a Husserlian 
term that recurs frequently in this part of the book, body memory involves the sedimentation of 
many experiences in the course of the body’s history (incidentally, it would have been good to see 
the notion of sedimentation discussed in more detail in this part of the book, with more attention, 
for example, also to the Merleau-Pontian idea that bodies have a prehistory, and a trajectory that is 
not reducible to experience).
To speak only of dispositions, however, runs the risk of reducing body memory to something 
unconscious and purely ‘automatic’. Disposition is a quintessentially behaviouristic notion, and as 
such is not meant to refer to, or even imply, a conscious or lived experience. Various contributors 
to the volume mention this worry in response to Fuchs’ approach, and then proceed to elaborate 
this point in different ways. Maxine Sheets-Johnstone in particular draws on Luria’s notion of 
‘kinetic melody’ (the experience of a structured kinetic event) to develop her own conception of 
kinaesthetic memory (note that this contribution repeats arguments already presented in Sheets-
Johnstone, 2003). Kinaesthetic memory is the recollection of one’s own body moving, and of how 
specific movements feel. It plays an important role, Sheets-Johnstone suggests, in enabling people 
to remember sequences of movements when performing a choreography for example, or more 
generally when learning any complex movement. Sheets-Johnstone’s discussion is a useful 
reminder that the lived or experienced body (the Leib, rather than the Körper or the body taken as 
a physical object) is not just the entirely ‘transparent’ (i.e. unheeded) body that ‘forgets itself’ as it 
acts in the world. Rather, the lived body also includes a variety of bodily sensations – kinaesthetic 
sensations, and more besides (e.g. visceral sensations).
The idea that talk of dispositions does not accurately capture the phenomenology of body 
memory can also be developed in relation to, specifically, pain and traumatic memory. This is a 
point that none of the contributors to this part of the volume explicitly addresses, so I shall briefly 
elaborate on it. To talk of pain and traumatic memory only in terms of non-conscious dispositions 
overlooks the dramatic changes in consciousness and existence that pain and trauma bring about. 
It is profoundly misleading to talk of pain and traumatic memories as ‘non-conscious’ until a 
specific past pain or trauma are re-experienced. If that were the case, the difference between trau-
matized and non-traumatized individuals would consist only in the frequency of episodes of con-
scious panic, or similar (likewise for pain). Yet, it seems more appropriate to say that traumatized 
and non-traumatized individuals live in very different worlds. Pained and traumatized individuals 
do not necessarily undergo specific conscious experiences of pain and trauma all the time; how-
ever, pain and trauma affect their existence as a whole, influencing how they relate to their own 
body, other people and objects and situations in the world. As Heidegger ([1926] 1996) might 
have put it, pain and trauma are specific ways of being attuned to the world (specific ‘moods’, in 
his terminology). Even more aptly, we could say that pain and trauma are existential feelings 
(Ratcliffe, 2008), that is, ways of being bodily in the world that influence the kind of affective 
experiences one has and can have. Like Heideggerian moods, existential feelings are ever- 
present, inescapable features of human existence. Unlike moods, however, existential feelings are 
also clearly bodily feelings; more specifically, they are feelings in which the world is experienced 
in certain ways through the body. From this perspective, a pain memory is not just the disposition 
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to re-experience a certain pain under certain circumstances, but a broader and deeper existential 
condition that affects how one lives in the world, including how one experiences oneself and 
one’s body in it. Likewise for traumatic memory. A past trauma influences the perception of what 
the world affords in terms of actions and interpersonal relations; in particular, trauma often closes 
down and restricts the number of perceived opportunities for action and relationships. In this way, 
trauma can be clearly part of one’s experience even when it does not actualize itself in the form 
of a panic attack.
One thing that I would have liked to see in this part of the book, but did not, is an original and 
focused phenomenological characterization of body memory. If one has never heard of phenome-
nology, and would like to have a general idea of what it could contribute to the topic of body 
memory, then this first part of the book does the job. However, the various chapters of this part of 
the book tend to reproduce already existing phenomenological (primarily Husserlian) considera-
tions about the body, without making any real effort to develop a novel contribution that pertains 
specifically to the phenomenon of body memory, fleshing out its uniqueness. While reading, I often 
had the impression that the topic of the book was just as an occasion to rehearse the contributors’ 
views on the body and bodily consciousness, without, however, engaging closely and distinctively 
with the phenomenon at stake (in some cases, it was even unclear how the discussion related at all 
to the theme of body memory).
Another weakness of this section is that it does not help the reader appreciate the relevance of 
phenomenology for other disciplines. How does this part of the book relate to the other two? Can 
phenomenology inform empirical research and therapy? If so, how? For example, Elizabeth 
Behnke in her contribution develops an account, in many respects interesting, of the experience of 
enduring. With this term, she refers to the reiteration of a style of coping with difficult past experi-
ences that has become ‘one’s ongoing style of experiencing per se’ (p. 89). This style of experienc-
ing affects not just present but also future modalities of acting in the world. In addition, Behnke 
describes what happens at the bodily level when a trauma is resolved; here, she emphasizes in 
particular that one regains a sense of kinaesthetic possibilities. But how exactly can these descrip-
tions of experience inform therapy in productive ways? Likewise, once we acknowledge the phe-
nomenon of kinaesthetic memory, for example, then what we do with it? What are its implications 
for psychology?
Review of Part II: ‘Contributions from Cognitive Sciences’ (by 
Dylan Trigg)
The comparatively recent pairing of phenomenology and the cognitive sciences has been regarded 
by some as a ‘rebirth’ of the method (Gallagher, 2012). Indeed, it is hard to doubt the contribution 
the cognitive sciences have made to phenomenology. Equally, the role phenomenology has played 
in contributing to cognitive sciences has been as vital. In each case, over the last 20 years, phenom-
enology and the cognitive sciences have converged in order to attest to the primacy of our embod-
ied being-in-the-world. The realization that phenomenology (and phenomenological insights) can 
contribute to a scientific analysis has not only revitalized phenomenology as a method, it has also 
reconfigured the boundaries between philosophy and science (see, for example, Thompson, 2007).
It is against this background that the second part of Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement is 
situated. Indeed, many of the contributions in this section draw on the framework of embodied 
cognition and include such issues as implicit memory, embodied processes, emotions, movement 
and a final chapter considering some methodological issues at stake. These are rich themes, and in 
a short review, I will give a critical overview of only some of the chapters before turning to some 
broader issues at the end of my contribution.
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The first chapter in the section contends with the question of body memory through considering 
the explicit and implicit measurements of body memory (p. 115). The chapter is a brief (5-page) 
excursion into various issues related to recent research, and while it provides a useful summary of 
this research, it does little to advance these debates. As we find out, the relation between cognitive 
psychology and body memory is something of an uneasy one, the author describing how the term 
would be seen as ‘something strange and maybe as an esoteric concept!’ (p. 117). The reason for 
this is because cognitive psychology focuses on the measurability of perception rather than mem-
ory. Indeed, the main critical focus of the chapter – albeit a tenuous one – is to ascertain whether 
the category of implicit memory can even be measured. The author speculates rather loosely 
whether ‘perceptual priming’ can be applied in such a method, but the chapter ends on an impasse 
in terms of querying if ‘implicit body memory’ cannot simply be a philosophical concept but also 
elevated to the status of an ‘empirical concept’ (p. 119).
A following chapter by Jung and Sparenberg is a focused analysis of cognition, embodiment and 
action. Here, the issue concerns how a human subject can respond to a given thing – a person, a 
situation, a glass and a sentence – such that their body acts in a particular way. The authors give an 
example of how ‘partners in a conversation imitate each other automatically and unconsciously’ 
(p. 142). How is such a mirroring possible? The authors survey various experiments that reveal 
some curious findings, such as when participants respond to a movement in the arm of a human 
being but not in the arm movement of a robot. Some of these findings are explained in terms of a 
requirement for predictability, ‘because it allows the selection of an appropriate response in 
advance of an anticipated event and is therefore more advantageous than simply reacting to upcom-
ing events’ (pp. 144–145). In this way, action is regarded as a response to a time-lag between per-
ception and the processing of a cognitive function (not least, memory).
In the latter part of the chapter, the authors turn to the issue of bodily intentionality via the theme 
of contagious phenomena such as yawning and the affectivity of facial expressions. After an excur-
sion into various experiments, a tentative conclusion is that such ‘facial mimicry’ is due in part to 
‘mirror neurons’, which were ‘presumably […] beneficial during the evolutionary process’ 
(p. 147). As with the other chapters, these findings are presented tentatively without really engag-
ing with their implications. For example, the issue of evolution is employed as if it had explanatory 
value. To develop this relation between mimicry and evolutionary process, however, a much richer 
analysis of the themes in question would be needed. Indeed, while the chapter states its aim as 
providing a ‘snapshot’ of recent research (again, a pattern common to many of the chapters), there 
is an abiding lack of commitment on behalf of the authors to posit their own interpretation of the 
phenomena in anything other than a cursory way.
The 11th chapter is interesting, in that it returns to Fuchs’ account of body memory, which 
itself is an important contribution to the research, in order to ‘test’ it through interview data. Such 
questions include ‘Do you know the term “body memory?”’ ‘Can you give me an example from 
your own experience?’ and ‘What is your explanation for how “body memory” works?’ The 
results of these findings conform with the theories of Fuchs rather than depart from them. After a 
succinct summary of Fuchs’ theories (discussed in the first part of this review), Koch moves on to 
the various studies and results of her research. Among the results, negative and painful emotions 
tend to be more remembered than supposedly positive ones (a point that both Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche were highly attuned to). Whereas these experiments reinforce Fuchs’ fundamental 
claims, some ‘minor’ suggestions are put forward in order to extend his taxonomy (p. 182). New 
subcategories are suggested given that a category such as ‘situational body memory’ is thought 
too broad to be helpful.
This is a helpful chapter in demonstrating how phenomenologically grounded research coexists 
alongside empirical research. However, like many of the chapters, it lacks critical attention to its 
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own framework. From the outset, ‘qualitative empirical testing’ is presented as ‘further validat[ing]’ 
theoretical work. But this very relation is not brought into question, but instead assumed as a meth-
odological given. It is far from obvious to me (as someone working outside of empirical research) 
how information such as interview data plays a role as validating theoretical work.
The penultimate chapter of the section is the standout chapter for the reason that it considers a 
specific illustration of body memory, and thus demonstrates a thematic commitment lacking in the 
other chapters. The topic of the chapter is the issue of body memory in relation to the ritual prac-
tices in the Western Himalayas. The argument is made that ‘ritual performance plays an important 
role in creating and preserving memories, and in reinforcing social hierarchy and dealing with 
social suffering’ (p. 227). This thematically rich material stands in sharp contrast to the preceding 
chapters, and is a welcome interruption. Not only is the issue of the preservation of the past central 
to body memory, it would seem that body memory allows us an incisive perspective on this topic. 
The authors, I think, are right to approach this material by considering the body as something to be 
interpreted, given that the question of the pastness and the body is as much an issue of experience 
as it is critique.
After an engaging foray into anthropological accounts of the body, covering both figures such 
as Clifford Geertz and Merleau-Ponty, the reader gains a more specific sense of how the rituals are 
structured. At stake is a transmission of an already embodied skill through mimesis and Bourdieu’s 
notion of habitus (p. 230). In this way, rituals such as dance are seen as transmitting the past, in 
such a way that is peculiar to the body’s retention of time. The authors proceed to describe how 
such practices are inclusive owing to their collectivity. Such a conception allows us to critique less 
bodily oriented modes of memory, in terms of establishing or reinforcing boundaries between self 
and other, public and private. The epistemic advantage of body memory, as the authors present it, 
is that it blurs such distinctions through being situated in the in-between. There is much to say on 
this fascinating chapter that space cannot allow, but it stands out not only for engaging deeply 
within the phenomena in question, but for also eliciting insights from that investigation that shed 
light more generally on the ambiguities of body memory.
As indicated, while I found the penultimate chapter in this section to be of value, the bulk of 
the treatment of body memory from a cognitive perspective in this part of the book is largely 
problematic. My concerns are threefold, each point implicit in my comments. First, at no point did 
I find an interrogation of the role of data or experiments within the framework of phenomenology. 
This is especially problematic given that many of the entries in the section rely on data to ‘dem-
onstrate’ their findings. The result of this is that a conceptual analysis of the role of empirical 
work is left untouched. With a phenomenon such as body memory – which is arguably a genu-
inely multifaceted phenomenon – this reduction of experience to quantifiable data risks under-
mining the specificity of the topic. This leads to my second concern. The chapters are marked by 
an overreliance on exposition, and, to echo the concerns of Colombetti, lack any kind of commit-
ment to the production of original works of phenomenological inquiry. While there is undoubt-
edly a scholastic value in the review literature offered in the volume, such literature does little to 
advance debates, except in the most minor way. Finally, related to both these concerns, with the 
exception of the penultimate chapter, the characterization of the body throughout these chapters 
is united by a sense of uniformity and homogeneity. At no point is the body in its specificity – as 
anxious, happy, depressed, ecstatic, pregnant, possessed, haunted, and so forth – given attention 
to. Rather, what we have is the presentation of the body lacking diversity. Given the interdepend-
ent relation between affectivity, embodiment, and memory, this failure to attend to the heteroge-
neity of the lived experience of the body constitutes a critical oversight in this section of the book. 
Despite this, the fact that interdisciplinary research on body memory is thriving is a welcome 
prospect for attending to this oversight.
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Review of Parts III and IV: ‘Contributions from Embodied 
Therapies’ (by Susanne Ravn)
For some years, my own research interests have centred on investigating how the practice-based 
insights of dancers and athletes can be explored in combination with phenomenological insights 
and – the other way around – how their practice-based insights can contribute to phenomenological 
descriptions. From the outset, I would therefore like to state that I do not work in the therapeutic 
field, but feel strongly connected to the methodological challenges concerning how researchers 
might bring practice-based insights into theoretical discussions. I find that there is huge potential 
in exploring how current descriptions, theories and discussions might be challenged, modified or 
reworked according to the cases presented from the site of practitioners. I was therefore excited to 
be asked to review ‘Part III: Contributions from Embodied Therapies’ in Body Memory, Metaphor 
and Movement.
There is no doubt that one could read the 10 chapters in Part III to gain a certain insight into 
which kinds of practices therapists work with and how these practices, according to the therapists, 
can induce changes for the client/student/patient. In this sense, the chapters show that therapists 
include embodied practices in different and interesting ways – and that the various therapeutic 
approaches draw on different definitions of body memory.
Two of the chapters in Part III stand out concerning the presentation of the methodological 
considerations – especially in relation to how the applied methods are presented in transparent 
ways. In Chapter 19, Panhofer et al. describe and discuss how body memory can be used in relation 
to a narrative approach. Theoretical considerations concerning the narrative as well as related con-
cepts are presented in an informed way, and it is, accordingly, interesting to be invited into the 
different opinions and related discussions concerning if, or how, one’s experience has to be part of 
a personal ‘story-line’. The different ways of thinking about the narrative thereby form a theoreti-
cal basis for the reader to follow the authors when they indicate that further study is required in 
order to better understand ‘what impact processing through embodied perceptual practices such as 
movement, play and dance would have’ (p. 312) to narrative processes, and whether the embodied 
practices are to be considered a form of narration themselves. Based on convincing documentation, 
the authors bring awareness to how the use of metaphors becomes accentuated when the client is 
working with a combination of movement and narration, and how movement might present an 
alternative to language when telling one’s history – playing or coping with one’s memories.
In Chapter 25, Michalak et al. focus on describing the positive effects of practising Mindfulness 
in relation to depression. This is one of the few chapters in Part III where the actual practice is 
described, so that the reader can follow what has been done in the practice referred to as 
Mindfulness and how the empirical descriptions of these practices have been dealt with analyti-
cally. The authors bring awareness to how depression is also to be understood as possibly related 
to the establishment of bodily and cognitive feedback loops, which ‘lock subsystems into a self-
perpetuating configuration that maintains depression’ (p. 400). The last part is, as the authors 
also state themselves, more speculative, but nevertheless interesting, as they present relevant 
questions for future studies and indicate new ways of dealing with Mindfulness in relation to the 
possible body memory of depression.
In the remaining eight chapters in Part III, there are serious methodological challenges, which 
ultimately create problems concerning how we are to understand and use the therapeutic knowl-
edge and practice-based insight presented in the chapters. In most of these eight chapters, body 
memory is referred to and handled as if it can be revealed ‘on its own terms’ (e.g. Caldwell, 
Eberhard-Kaechele, Pylvänäinen and Shahmar-Levy, Kruithoff). It seems that body memory, 
implicitly or explicitly, is thought of as if the body were a lived entity storing past experiences in 
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its ‘inside’. For example, Caldwell in Chapter 16 states that all parts of the body form a network, 
and together produce the mind. Subsequently, this kind of network, named body, is to be ‘encoded’. 
In Chapter 18, Pylvänäinen defines body memory as ‘the name for the embodied information stor-
age function of the body’ (p. 290). In other chapters, the authors refer to the body’s ‘natural knowl-
edge’ (Chapter 21, Konopatsch and Payne) or state that the movers/client are requested and 
expected to move so that ‘one is true to oneself’ (Chapter 23, Koch and Harvey).
In the broad perspective of qualitative research, the chapters appear to present a relatively naïve 
methodological contradiction in how they describe body, movement and body memory in relation 
to the therapeutic situation. That is, on the one hand, they emphasize how, for example, traumatic 
events take place in relational and context-dependent settings. On the other hand, in the descrip-
tions and references to the therapeutic practices, they appear to ignore that the therapeutic situation 
also includes contextual constraints and expectations concerning what to do (or not to do) – how to 
move and sense (or not to move and sense) being a client/patient/student (see, for example, 
McCormack’s (2003) critical discussion of a dance therapeutic practice). The implicit constraints 
and expectations related to the therapeutic situation might be beneficial for how past experiences 
can unfold. However, in a methodological sense, I would have liked to see a presentation of the 
settings and changing contexts of the therapeutic practices along with more thorough methodologi-
cal considerations – such as how the actual group dynamics and the expectations of the participants 
influence the therapeutic process; what is the implicit request of being a ‘good client’; and how do 
the patients, who leave or end the therapeutic process without successful outcome, describe their 
experiences of the practice. Without such critical methodological considerations, there is a clear 
danger that descriptions and discussions end up being used in a circular argumentation. I will 
specify this point in the following.
Drawing on a specific kind of dance therapy, named Dancergia, Winther in Chapter 22 presents 
her therapeutic work and her work in teaching situations. By being a practitioner–researcher, 
exploring her own practice, Winther has, according to her own descriptions, access to an immedi-
ate experience of embodied memories and bodily expressions, and she is therefore able to describe 
‘aspects of situations with a depth and empathic and bodily understanding that traditional forms 
of research would not be able to maintain’ (p. 354). However, besides the author’s statements, no 
further argumentation is offered for how the presented narratives should be ‘closer’ to the body 
(p. 355). The author does not appreciate that narration is itself a construction (as Panhofer et al. 
argue a few chapters before). Compared to the thorough discussion on observations and inter-
views, which can be found in the domain of qualitative research (e.g. ethnography, auto- 
ethnography, performance studies and action research), the author’s methodological considera-
tions appear, at best, vague.
In Chapter 20, Shahar-Levy introduces her chapter by stating that she will present a theory, 
which she has developed. She emphasizes that her theory is not a scientific discourse, rather it 
revolves around how behavioural patterns and emotive body language develop from ‘core biolog-
ical-relational prototypes’ (p. 327). Such statements, however, present, indeed, a challenging dis-
course of what and how the researcher can describe a phenomenon. The episodes from the 
therapist’s ‘diary’, which are then presented, are accompanied by the author’s reflection on the 
cases – according to her own theory. To be able to understand this theory, at a minimum the actual 
embodied practices need to be described along with some methodological reflections concerning 
the author’s dual role as practitioner and researcher.
In summary, it seems as if the eight chapters are focused on presenting ideas and theories which 
are more or less inherent to different therapeutic practices. Beyond Panhofer et al. and Michalak 
et al., it is difficult, however, to follow how the chapters in Part III contribute to the wider scientific 
descriptions and understandings of body memory. With respect to the central questions of the 
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whole book, the chapters in Part III in different ways show that therapists access body memory in 
order to efficiently treat individuals. How the therapists do this through embodied practices and 
how these practices might add to the descriptions and discussion of body memory is only scarcely 
dealt with. Furthermore, despite referring to phenomenological thinking in many of the chapters, it 
is very difficult to follow how phenomenological clarifications of important concepts have had any 
real importance for the discussions and argumentations presented in the chapters. Phenomenological 
descriptions are generally presented to link to a specific definition of body memory, as, for exam-
ple, Fuchs’ characterization of the various forms of memory. With reference to one of the relevant 
questions raised by Colombetti, in her review of Part I, it is therefore difficult to see how phenom-
enological descriptions of experience have informed the therapeutic practices or the theories of 
these practices in productive ways.
The book ends with a separate concluding chapter by Summa et al., who state that body memory 
is a form of operative intentionality (p. 418) and that ‘it is worthwhile stressing that […] perceptual 
and kinaesthetic habitual memory at the same time opens up and limits our experiential possibili-
ties, and this is the reason why it gives shape to an individual style of experiencing’ (p. 420, 
author’s emphasis). Along these phenomenological descriptions, I find it interesting that Summa 
et al. also consider how the Bergsonian concepts of ‘habit memory’ (Bergson, 1911) might corre-
spond to the descriptions of body memory presented in the book. It seems relevant, in continuation 
with Summa et al.’s brief presentation, to remember that Bergson argues that body memory/habit-
memory is not just ‘re-experienced’ – and nor does it work as a set of embodied dispositions, which 
can be recalled on ‘its own terms’. Rather, body memory/habit-memory is to be understood as a 
past unfolding in the present. It would, no doubt, be interesting if the researchers in the therapeutic 
field in the future could actively relate their practice-based insights to phenomenological related 
descriptions of body memory/habit-memory – and consequently include thorough methodological 
considerations concerning how the expectations of the therapists, the contexts of the therapeutic 
settings and actual culture(s) involved form part of what becomes performed and experienced as 
body memory in the therapeutic practices.
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